A rhetorical roundabout beyond the Yellow Sea

Donald Trump may be an advocate of the “madman school of diplomacy”, but might Kim Jong-eun be using the same strategy . . .  

SEOUL – With Kim Jong-eun threatening to launch missiles in the direction of - if not directly at - the U.S. island of Guam in response to Trump’s “Fire and Fury” speech aimed at rattling the DPRK into getting “its act together,” is the world about to witness its first actual bilateral nuclear war (assuming China and India hold off just long enough)?

Is your correspondent finally going to get the message and bail out before this corner of the world blows up along with an uncertain chunk of U.S. real estate? 

As both Kim Jong-eun and Donald Trump seemingly careen headlong into a potential no-nuclear-punches-barred confrontation that would undo both of them -- the former physically and the latter politically -- there is some basis for remaining sanguine in the expectation that neither will actually go over the brink and take the other with him.

An assessment of the objectives of each and the risks to both underlies such sangfroid.

It is an assessment that presents a more nuanced understanding of Kim Jong-eun, his ambitions and the direction in which he is leading North Korea.

It is based upon a convergence of views by several highly-informed Korean-speaking, long-term observers of, and visitors to, North Korea who are well-published on the internal dynamics of the Hermit Kingdom.

So what is going on?

Knowledgeable North Korea watchers opine that Kim Jong-eun’s ultimate goal is to die as his father and grandfather did: naturally and in control.

The three threats to that goal, elite conspiracy, popular uprising, and external intervention, are each being addressed by the young dynast in Pyongyang.

There have been two major surprises about Kim Jong Un since he succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il, upon the latter’s death in 2011.

The first surprise is just how quickly the inexperienced, buffoonish-looking, presumed political neophyte cemented his power through adroit ruthlessness.

Whereas his father laid low for three years following Kim Il-Sung’s death in 1992 (during the first nuclear crisis), the third Kim has moved more decisively.

In the five years since he assumed power, he has moved against both his own family (killing an uncle and brother in the process) and the military leadership (the only institution with the means to remove him).

Defence Ministers and Military Chiefs-of-Staff have been routinely reshuffled (as reported frequently in ATI), ostensibly to prevent the formation of any anti-Kim network. These manoeuvres are not designed for military efficiency or preparedness, but rather to prevent an elite conspiracy from ousting him.

The second surprise is Kim’s reported popularity based on a combination of fairly impressive (albeit from a low base) economic growth, nominally 3.9% (Bank of Korea estimate) but reportedly a few points higher in reality, and his image of defiance against the U.S. as he fulfills Kim Il-sung’s dream of a nuclear-armed State.

However, although the DPRK has ceased to be a centrally-planned economy in practice, Kim and those supporting him are acutely aware that overt, systemic reform may produce the same results that USSR reforms (remember glastnost and perestroika?) in the late 1980s did.

Hence, systemic reforms (legal and structural) necessary for continued growth will not be undertaken.

Effective and reliable legal guarantees for foreign investors will continue to remain elusive, and thus such investment will continue to bypass the North.

As for external threat, a viable nuclear defence with the ultimate goal of second strike capability remains the surest, clearest means for regime survival against outside intervention.

The regime is acutely aware of the fate of Qaddafi, who relinquished pursuit of nuclear arms in exchange for the allure of Western guarantees of security in 2003, only to be ousted and killed in 2011.

As the Korea Central News Agency warned its readers on March 22 of that year, the US used “such sweet words as ‘guarantee of security’ and ‘improvement of relations’ to disarm itself -- and then swallowed [Libya] up by force”.

When North Korea says it will never negotiate away its nuclear programme, its leadership can be taken at its word.

Why the heightened tensions now? In two words: sanctions and exercises.

One reason for the timing is the UN sanctions unanimously approved by the UN Security Council in the form of Resolution 2371 on August 5, 2017. These sanctions on North Korean exports of coal, iron, lead and seafood target roughly one-third of its export revenue (at least US$1 billion).

The sanctions are intended to strain the North Korean economy, thereby undermining Kim’s second surprising success, economic growth, which fulfills one-half of Kim’s regime-sustaining goal of instilling what Professor Andrei Lankov has often stated, “fear in the heart and food in the stomach”, of the DPRK elite and populace.

The other reason is the perennial Ulchi Freedom Guardian joint U.S./South Korean military exercises that began on August 21.

Whenever the allies stage joint military drills, Pyongyang cranks up the shrill volume to full blast.

By doing so, it strengths an image of defiance that reportedly goes down well among both elite and populace -- and reinforces the role of the U.S. as a nefarious lightning rod for North Korean anger (and an excuse for economic failings on the part of the broadly-sanctioned, non-economically- driven DPRK regime).

Donald Trump may be an advocate of the “madman school of diplomacy”, but might a counterpart less than half his age be using the same strategy?

By threatening Guam, Kim goaded President Trump into departing from the measured rhetoric of U.S. diplomacy past and present. This gave Kim the “Fire and Fury” bombast that will play well in Pyongyang’s rhetorical war of words.

Not surprisingly, the response from Pyongyang is that it will wait a little longer while it assesses Trump’s “foolish and stupid conduct”.

As this bilateral rhetoric is going nowhere, neither is your correspondent.

Peter Sylvestre is Seoul correspondent for ATI Magazine