The options ahead for Suu Kyi . . .

WHICH way will the military move? There are low-risk and high-risk options facing Burma’s Suu Kyi . . .

MANY key issues remain unresolved, even in the wake of Burma’s headline-grabbing general election in November, not least the future role of the military in Government and the quality of governance under Aung San Suu Kyi.

Burma’s military leaders were magnanimous in defeat, so to speak, and contrary to expectations appear to have accepted the electoral results. For good reason.
The military has embedded in the country’s constitution, drawn up in 2008, its ongoing role in Government. As well as reserving 25 per cent of seats in Parliament, the constitution guarantees complete control over three key Government departments — defence, internal affairs and borders.
According to two analysts, Kai Ostwald and Paul Schuler from the University of British Columbia and the University of Arizona respectively, the military is guaranteed essentially unchecked control over a significant portion of the State, and insulation of that control from electoral politics.
In their paper, Myanmar’s Landmark Election: Unresolved Questions, Ostwald and Schuler say the military continues to have control of decisions over personnel and funding. They point out that the Department of Internal Affairs is of special significance to Myanmar’s reform process, since the entire bureaucratic apparatus of the State falls under its purview.
This, in essence, grants the military unchecked control over the policy implementation process. With 25 per cent of all seats in the lower and upper houses of the Burmese Parliament, the military is able to veto any proposed constitutional changes, and ensures its continued presence in politics. Against this background, Ostwald and Schuler say the election is better conceived as one to determine who shares power with the military in the governing of the country — rather than one to determine who directly governs Burma.  
Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) resoundingly defeated the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the historic election. It was clearly a rejection of the military-run Government.
The NLD won enough seats to secure a
Parliamentary majority and to nominally take control of the Government.  Although she is not able to become President under the Burmese constitution, Suu Kyi has repeatedly insisted since her Party won the election that she will be in control. This means that whoever becomes President will govern under her direction.
Will the Burmese people’s faith in Auug San Suu Kyi be misplaced?
The landslide victory brings with it massive expectations for change, both from domestic and international audiences. Yet Suu Kyi, a pragmatist and political realist, will recognise that she faces considerable constraints in her decision-making, write Ostwald and Schuler.
They note that she does not have the capacity to push through reforms that encroach too severely on the military’s interests.
“Two scenarios are possible. One is that the NLD, conscious of its need to work with the military, will be cautious in reform in deference to the military. For this strategy to succeed, the NLD will need to temper the expectations of a country that expects momentous changes in line with a momentous election.”
They say that failure to carry change risks the Party losing support in future elections.
“In just one example, will citizens abide by the military’s continued domination of several key economic sectors?” they write.
They canvass the scenario of the NLD trying to respond to public dissatisfaction by engaging in rapid reforms, or mobilising support to reform the constitution.
Ostwald and Schuler call this as “a high risk approach”, carrying the danger of panicking the military and triggering a coup. Burma could become like Thailand, which suffers perpetual political instability because it lacks the institutional safeguards to prevent interference from the military.
They also ask if Suu Kyi will be able to transit from being the symbolic face of opposition against military rule to being the political leader of a precarious Coalition? Some reports have already emerged to suggest that she herself has become “more autocratic”.
Her former role seldom required the type of compromise that carried a risk of alienating support, say the analysts.  “She now faces the perfect storm of high expectations but limited formal power. Her necessarily pragmatic decisions will rarely convince all.” And for the millions of Burmese who turned out to vote for her — more so than the NLD per se — the excitement of her win could soon evaporate.
Therefore, the cynical could fairly ask: has much has really changed in Burma after the election? Will Burma move into a new era?
(Myanmar’s Landmark Election: Unresolved Questions, published by the ISEAS Yusok Ishak Institute in Singapore.)